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THE MARRIAGE TAX REVISITED: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE
DAN SUEOTNIK*
"[I]t is better to marry than to burn,"' advises a widely read
Authority. The implication is that marrying and burning are mu-
tually exclusive. They are not. In the tax area, among other areas,
married folk often get burned.
The reason is that matrimony can lead to the "marriage tax. ' 2
This "tax" comes into play upon the union of two single persons
with roughly the same level of income. An illustration is in order.
Consider two taxpayers each with taxable income of $25,000.1 In
1988 their total tax if they are both singles comes to $9,360. If they
are married, by contrast, the tax amounts to $10,133. The extra or
incremental cost to the taxpayer resulting from marriage is the mar-
riage tax, in this case $773. 4
* Dan Subotnik is Associate Professor of Law at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center and Lecturer at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. The author wishes
to thank Marie Brillman for her invaluable assistance.
1. 1 Corinthians 7:9.
2. Discussion of the marriage tax has often suffered from a certain imprecision of language.
The word "income" has been used too frequently without elaboration as to whether it is taxable,
adjusted gross or simply gross income that is being referred to.
3. It is probably more useful to define the marriage tax as the difference in tax liability resulting
from the standard deduction as well as the rates. This is because the standard deduction in effect
applies to all taxpayers and thus is really part of the rate structure. In 1988 the standard deduction
for singles is $3,000, while for couples it is $5,000. In short, a two-earner couple that has the same
gross income as two singles will have taxable income that is $I,000 higher. On the assumption that
the parties in the hypothetical had equal gross income (and thus the taxable income is $51,000 for
the couple and $25,000 for each of the singles) the marriage tax comes to $1,053.
4. In the 1970's, when the rate-based marriage penalty was frequently much higher than it is
today, several cases were brought challenging the constitutionality of I.R.C. § I (which provides the
rates for singles and marrieds). The taxpayers consistently lost. Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896
(Ct. Cl. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958 (N.D.
Ind. 1976) aff'd per curiam, 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978); Druker
v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983).
The marriage tax is, of course, the divorce bonus. To avoid the marriage tax, one couple in
the mid-1970's divorced in December-marital status for filing purposes being determined at the end
of the year-and remarried in January. The tax court signaled its unhappiness with that device in
1127
1
Subotnik: The Marriage Tax Revisited: An Analysis of the Tax Consequences o
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
One should not conclude that taxpayers marry only for poorer.
Many couples find that marriage confers a significant tax benefit.
To illustrate, if the wife in the previous example had taxable income
of $50,000 and was the only money-maker in the family, her income
tax based on her married status would be $10,133. If single, her tax
would have been $11,680. The tax savings resulting from her married
status comes to $1,547, which is the "marriage bonus."
There is a fairly substantial literature on the treatment of mar-
riage by the tax system. A number of commentators - Professors
Bittker, Gann, McIntyre and Oldman among them - have made
significant contributions.5 There are two important reasons, how-
ever, for yet another article. First, these articles were written against
the backdrop of a far different Internal Revenue Code from that
which exists today. Since 1975, when the first of these articles was
written, tax rates have come down considerably (from 70% to 33/0
in the top bracket, for example), and the two-wage earner deduction
has been enacted and repealed. 6 Moreover, although it is widely
known that the marriage tax and bonus were not eliminated by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86), the extent to which those fea-
tures have survived and changed under the Act is only now becoming
apparent; and the economists who are providing data on the subject
are already beginning to ask whether, under the new law, married
couples are being treated fairly.
The second and principal reason for writing this article is that
the marriage tax - i.e., the marginal tax cost resulting from mar-
Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980), remanded, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981).
It should be pointed out that, except in unusual cases, far from solving the marriage tax problem,
separate filing actually aggravates it. For one thing, the separate return rates (I.R.C. § l(d)) are higher
than those for singles (I.R.C. § 1(c)). Provisions of the tax law defining taxable income also discourage
separate returns. For example, under I.R.C. § 86 social security receipts are taxed less favorably to
separate filers than to singles. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
5. See Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389 (1975); Brazer,
The Income Tax Treatment of the Family, in Tra EcoNowcs OF TAXATION (H. Aaron and M. Boskin,
eds. 1980); Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 Tnx.
L. REv. 1 (1980); Gann, The Earned Income Deduction: Congress's 1981 Response to the"Marriage
Penalty" Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 468 (1983); McIntyre & Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a
Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HA~v. L. REV. 1573 (1977); O'Neil, Family Issues in
Taxation, in TAxING Tr FAMILY 1 (R. Penner ed. 1983) (see also responses to O'Neil by Minarik &
Cohen, Commentary, in TAxING aE FAYm 23).
6. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 901128
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riage - has been examined altogether too narrowly. There are nu-
merous tax consequences of marriage that go well beyond the rate
schedules. For example, under Internal Revenue Code § 86, a single
individual must report up to one-half of his social security receipts
as income if the total of that amount and his other income (including
his tax exempt interest income) exceeds $25,000. Two married in-
dividuals who file a joint return will find that up to one-half of
their social security receipts are taxable if their total income (sim-
ilarly computed) exceeds $32,000. Thus two single taxpayers receiv-
ing social security payments will often find that their marriage
increases their tax burden.
7
Another illustration of the tax effect of marriage is the position
of spouses under the estate and gift tax rules. 8 These provisions,
which work in favor of married couples, allow spouses to pass to
one another an unlimited amount of property free of transfer tax.
Thus this article - which consists of five parts - will update
and expand the analysis of the marriage tax. The first part explores
the existence and magnitude of the marriage tax and marriage bonus
(narrowly defined)9 under various income assumptions using 1988
rate schedules. The results are compared with those obtained under
1986 tax schedules. The second part summarizes the arguments for
and against current law which often produces a marriage tax and
bonus. It also sketches the history of the federal income tax in this
area. The third part looks broadly at the tax consequences of mar-
riage in the Internal Revenue Code. The fourth part examines the
rationales underlying the relevant Code provisions. Finally, the fifth
7. An illustration will help here since the statute defies attempts to articulate the inclusion
formula in a generally comprehensible manner. Let's take two unmarried taxpayers, each with social
security receipts of $10,000, other income of $15,000, and $5,000 of tax-exempt income. None of
their social security receipts would be taxable because, taking into account only one-half of the social
security receipts, the total does not exceed the limit of $25,000. A married couple with each spouse
in the same financial position, would be required to include $9,000 of social security receipts in their
income because the $32,000 base amount has been exceeded. In this last case, if the taxpayers choose
to file separately, reportable income from social security would be $10,000. This results from the fact
that the base amount for separate filers is zero.
8. I.R.C. §§ 2056 & 2523 (1987).
9. That is, resulting only from application of the rate schedules and standard deduction tables.
See supra notes 2 & 3.
1988] 1129
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part draws certain conclusions from the previous analysis and find-
ings and makes a recommendation for a change in legislative policy.
As will be seen, deciding whether ultimately the tax system dis-
courages or encourages marriage can confound the most resolute
researcher.
I.
The new tax rate schedules and standard deductions are shown
in Tables 1 and 2. As Table 3 and Figures 1 to 610 defhonstrate,
the marriage tax (in the narrow sense) has survived TRA 86. This
is true for virtually all levels of income where there is rough income
equality between the spouses. Surprisingly, perhaps, at a number of
income levels the marriage tax has actually increased somewhat. For
upper income taxpayers, however, it has decreased and that decrease
has been dramatic. The marriage bonus has generally increased un-
der the new tax law.
The respective changes can be largely explained as resulting from:
(1) the across-the-board reduction in rates which, in turn, has low-
ered the cost of adding a second source of income to the first; (2)
the repeal of I.R.C. § 221, which allowed the two-wage earner de-
duction; and (3) the changes in the standard deduction and exemp-
tion amounts. Overall, it is estimated that in 1988 40% of United
States couples will pay a marriage tax while 55% will receive a mar-
riage bonus. The average tax and bonus are projected to be $1100
and $609, respectively."1
In sum, the marriage tax and bonus are still with us though the
former has lost some of its potency. Because of the continued ex-
istence of the marriage tax, analysts are beginning to raise the old
10. Tables I and 3 are from G. EsENwEIN, TAx REoum AcT OF 1986 (H.R. 3838) INDMIDUAL
INcomE TAX REFORm AND MARR AoE NETArrynY 5 (Congressional Research Service Document No.
86-6703).
Figures 1-6, are from H. RosEN, THE MARR AGE TAx Is DowN BuT NOT OuT (National Bureau
of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2231, 1987). Rosen assumes use of the standard deduction.
His assumption for unmarried couples is that the individual with higher earnings claims the two
children as dependents and files as head of household while the other parent files as a single. Since
Rosen's figures are based on wages, the data are not immediately comparable to the calculations at
the outset of this article which were based on taxable income. See supra notes 2 & 3.
11. See H. RosEN, supra note 10, at 12.
1130 [Vol. 90
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questions about whether the marriage-related nonneutralities in the
tax law warrant remedial action. 12 (No one, it might be observed,
is complaining about the marriage bonus.) Why, then, haven't we
scrapped the joint return-which is a cause of the marriage tax and
bonus-and moved to a system of individual filing or to some other
system which would effectively end the problem once and for all?
TABLE 1




15% $ 0- 29,750






























12. See H. ROSEN and G. ESENWEN, supra note 10.
Nonneutralities, or inefficiencies, are features of a tax system that penalize or reward taxpayer
actions that theoretically should not have such consequences. See W. KLiaN, PoLicy ANALYSIS OF TmE
FEDERAL INCoHm TAx 121-26 (1976).
* The top of the 33 percent bracket depends upon the number of exemptions. The schedules
for joint and head of household returns are based on the assumption of two exemptions; those for
separate and single returns assume one exemption. For each additional exemption, the 33 percent
bracket is increased by $10,920.
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13. Rosen explains the enormous tax disparity in this manner. See H. RosEN supra note 10.
"The increase is partly due to the fact that the standard deduction on a joint return is $2,400 less
than the sum of the deductions on head of household and single returns. In addition, the spouse
who was taking the earned income credit finds the amount of the credit reduced, perhaps to zero."
See infra note 58, for an exposition of the earned income credit.
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The Internal Revenue Code's current treatment of marriage is
the product of two objectives, a tax-equal system and a progressive
tax structure. The former goal refers to the desire to equalize the
tax burdens on married couples by attributing one-half of the family
income to each spouse, regardless of the relative spousal contri-
butions to that income. Thus, under tax equality, couple A with
each spouse earning $25,000 would be taxed the same as couple B
with income of $50,000, all of which is earned by one spouse.
The essential rationale for a tax-equal system is that income taxes
should be imposed on the person receiving the benefits of the in-
come. Arguably, since spouses ordinarily share in the enjoyment of
(or in the decision-making regarding the disposition of) the income,
the relative contributions of the parties should have no tax signif-
icance, even if the split is 100% to 0%.
Another argument in favor of income splitting between spouses
is that it is often exceedingly difficult to allocate income and de-
ductions, particularly itemized deductions, to the appropriate
spouse. 14 Compounding the problem is the similarity, if not identity,
of economic interests between spouses, which would allow (and has
allowed) taxpayers who are taxed individually to reduce taxes through
inter-spousal transactions. The assumed sharing of income and ex-
pense - and the related notion of ignoring sales between spouses
- bypasses these concerns.
The rationale for a progressive tax structure is more theoretical.
At least two arguments have been advanced. The first is that each
person has diminishing marginal utility for income so that a pro-
gressive system results in minimum overall sacrifice.15 The second,
14. To solve the problem of allocating itemized deductions, commentators have suggested split-
ting these deductions evenly, allocating them in relation to income or even allowing taxpayers to make
their own allocations as did N.Y. State on its tax returns. For analogous proposals regarding allocation
of income from property, see Brazer, supra note 5.
15. For the landmark article rejecting this first argument, see Blum & Kalven, The Uneasy
Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 417 (1952). See also, Blum, Revisiting The Uneasy
Case for Progressive Taxation, 60 TAxas 16 (1982). For a more general view of the area, see W.
KLEIN, supra note 12, at 12-32.
1988] 1139
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and more persuasive argument is that progression is a rational re-
sponse to the fact that (notwithstanding the old adage about the
requirements for success) rewards in our economic system are really
a function of inspiration as well as perspiration. Since, ex ante, no
one can know the measure of his vision, progression is an insurance
policy which eases the tax burden of those who come up short in
the lottery for native gifts.
In addition to tax equality and progression, most authorities who
have dealt with these issues contend that, ideally at least, yet another
objective should be sought - marriage neutrality. This principle
holds that marriage is not an act undertaken for business purposes;
therefore, it should have no effect on the tax cost to taxpayers who
choose to marry. Since the existing tax system produces both mar-
riage taxes and marriage bonuses, the goal of the marriage neutrality
is not being met.
It would be helpful if all three objectives could be achieved si-
multaneously. Unfortunately, as Professor Bittker and others have
shown, these objectives cannot coexist in one tax system. The fol-
lowing example should help illustrate the point. Consider A and B,
singles, each of whom makes $50,000. Under the principle of tax
equality, they should, if married, pay a total tax equal to the tax
paid by couple C and D, whose $100,000 income is all attributable
to C. To give effect to marriage neutrality, C and D married would
have to be taxed in the same amount as C and D unmarried. Thus
A and B, singles with income of $50,000 each, would have to pay
the same tax as C and D, singles, where C earns $100,000 and D
earns $0. However, this can be true only if the progressivity in the
system is eliminated.
Some commentators have taken the position that tax equality
should be eliminated; others would not give any effect to marriage
neutrality. There is theoretically no pure way out of this dilemma.
Taxing individuals on their enjoyment of income, limiting distortion,
and reducing administrative burdens are all time-honored tax goals.
If the three objectives cannot be simultaneously accomplished, how
do we rank them to determine which should be sacrificed?
As a practical matter, the progressive structure of the tax system
is probably beyond challenge; there is no significant constituency
[Vol. 901140
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for it. Moreover, studies have shown that many taxpayers are able
to mitigate the progressivity of tax rate schedules through good tax
planning.'6 The possibility exists, then, that eliminating the pro-
gressivity in the rate structure might make the effective tax rates of
the wealthy lower than those of the middle class. To be sure the
research referred to is not current and the game rules have changed
in recent years - for example, the capital gains deduction has been
eliminated. Nevertheless, it would seem that until there is good ev-
idence of a diminution of the effectiveness of tax planning, eimi-
nation of progressivity is not desirable.
Critics of tax equality - the marriage policy embedded in the
Code - argue that evidence of income sharing by spouses is really
inconclusive. They point to the divorce statistics, which no doubt
have caused many spouses to hesitate before fully sharing their in-
come and accumulated wealth, and to the increase in the use of
antenuptial agreements. To further support the proposition that
marriage neutrality is more important than tax equality, contem-
porary critics cite the trend away from the classical model of the
working husband and stay-at-home wife. 17 Arguably, this trend, which
by all accounts is expected to continue, suggests greater financial
independence of spouses.
There are other arguments against tax equality. A number of
studies have shown that the wage elasticity of the supply of labor
for the "incremental" wage earner (for convenience, the wife) in
the family is quite high. 8 Since the wife's earnings are added on to
16. See graph in R. GOODE, TsE INDrvmuAL INCOME TAx 224 (rev. ed. 1976) and accompanying
text.
17. See infra notes 125 and accompanying text.
18. See Boskin & Sheshinski, Optimal Tax Treatment of the Family: Married Couples, 20 J.
PUB. EcoN. 281 (19F3); Hall, Wages Income and Hours of Work in the U.S. Labor Force, in INCOME
MAINTENANCE AND LABOR SUPPLY 102-62 (G. Cain & H. Watts eds., 1973); Hausman & Poterba,
Household Behavior and Tax Reform, 1 J. ECON. PROsPECTIVES 105-08 (1987).
One can't help but wonder whether these studies are now out dated. Whereas once upon a time
the wife's income may have been seen as discretionary, it would seem now that her income is largely
viewed as essential. If so, she will come into the work force regardless of tax rate or her income;
perhaps she will work harder to earn the target number of dollars upon which the family agrees. In
more technical terms, of course, we are talking about a wife who was subject to the "substitution
effect" now displaying classical "income effects." See W. KlEIN, B. BrrT'R & L. STONE, FDERA.
INcoME TAXATION 29 (1987) for a brief discussion of these concepts.
19881 1141
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the husband's, the tax on her is often going to be greater than it
would be if she were able to file as a single. As a result, it is argued,
"second" earners are not entering the market in the numbers they
otherwise would. 19 This distortion against market work, it is further
argued, is compounded by the fact that the value of homemaking
services is hot imputed to the family, which causes a related, though
different, inequality - one between the tax positions of the one-
earner and two-earner couples. The latter can purchase homemaking
services in the marketplace only. with after-tax income. The same
bias against the two-earner family is made worse, it is claimed, by
the fact that, unlike in the case of the classical family, in the two-
earner family both spouses have nondeductible work expenses such
as business clothes, commuting, and restaurant lunches.2°
Perhaps the strongest argument against the tax-equality principle
is that, as will be demonstrated, it can lead to the marriage tax.
Why, ask marriage neutrality proponents, should two equal-earning
taxpayers pay more tax simply because they marry? The only ex-
planation offered is that, unlike singles, married people live together
and thereby benefit from economies of scale. The vulnerability of
this explanation, of course, is that singles also frequently live to-
gether, whether romantically or not, and married couples often live
apart. 21
Having evaluated the various objectives, we are left with the
problem of choosing between two objectives, each with significant
virtues and limitations, a problem that tax theory does not provide
much help in resolving. If the system adopts tax equality (i.e., in-
come splitting), it tends to disadvantage two-earner couples. If the
system selects marriage neutrality as its guiding principle, it is not
giving effect to the likely sharing of income by spouses and is over-
19. See Murmell, The Couple versus the Individual Under the Federal Personal Income Tax,
in Tim EcoNohucs oF TAXATION 250 (H. Aaron & M. Boskin eds. 1980).
20. Bittker has argued, supra note 5, at 1435, that if the tax system is concerned about em-
ployment expenses, it should do something for all wage earners not only those who happen to be
married. Fair enough. But the denial of commuting expense deductions may present a special problem.
The theory of this denial is that a taxpayer can choose to live close to his place of business and
thereby avoid commuting expense. The two-earner couple, however, cannot eliminate commuting costs
if the spouses work at separate locations.
21. See Bittker, supra note 5, at 1452-55.
1142 [Vol. 90
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taxing one-earner couples. Accepting the notion that "a page of
history is worth a volume of logic" 22 it should be instructive to go
back in time and see how the problem has been solved in the past.
From 1913 to 1948, there was no marriage tax or bonus; marriage
neutrality held sway. Every individual filed a return reporting his
or her own income. In the interest of convenience, married taxpayers
could file jointly; but inasmuch as there was only one rate schedule
for all taxpayers, if a second spouse had income of his or her own,
a joint return would produce a higher family tax than would separate
returns.
One of the major tax controversies that arose in the first half
of this century was whether the tax law should recognize the 50/50
split of income effected by community property law. The issue was
resolved in 1930 when the Supreme Court held in Poe v. Seaborn23
that community property law should be honored.
In following years as tax rates increased to finance the war, con-
cern grew that, because income splitting was not available to
everyone, taxpayers in common law states were providing a massive
subsidy to those in other states. In 1948, after much debate, Con-
gress enacted legislation allowing married taxpayers in all jurisdic-
tions to file joint returns. The tax on the couple was made equal
to the total tax which would have been imposed on two singles, each
with one-half the combined income. Tax equality became the new
congressional marriage policy.
The result was a marriage bonus and a singles tax; for, given
the progressive tax structure, a single with $20,000 of taxable income
could save a great deal of money by marrying. And the tax savings
would be greatest if he married someone with no income at all.
In the 1960's came recognition that the rates might be unfair to
singles. Under some circumstances it was found that a single with
the same income as a married couple might find his tax liability as
much as 40% higher. The result of this raised consciousness was
22. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
23. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
1988] 1143
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that in 1969, effective for calendar year 1971, a new rate schedule
was adopted for singles only which ensured that taxes for this class
would be no higher than 20% above that for marrieds with the same
income.24 The tax system was still structured on a theory of tax
equality; but, as a result of this development, a marriage tax was
now possible as well as a marriage bonus. Thus, married taxpayers
ended up paying less tax than a single with the same income, but
more tax than two singles each with one-half that income.
This state of affairs persisted until 1981. Congress in 1980, taking
a further look at the relative tax burdens of singles and marrieds,
decided to alleviate the perceived burden on two-earner families.
Departing from tax equality, which was partially responsible for the
problem, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 221 which provided a deduction
to the family in an amount equal to 10% of the earned income of
the lesser-earning spouse. This deduction was limited to $3,000 per
year and moved the system in the direction of marriage neutrality,
at least for working couples.
The two-earner deduction was repealed by TRA 86 effective for
1987. This, of course, simply returned tax equality to its earlier
prominence. The Joint Committee on Taxation explained the change
this way: "Adjustments made in the standard deduction for married
individuals filing jointly and in the relationship of the rate schedules
for unmarried individuals and married individuals filing joint returns
are intended to compensate for the repeal of this provision. 25
In short, as social conditions have changed, we have gone from
marriage neutrality to tax equality, away from tax equality and back
to it. Notwithstanding all the turmoil, no major damage seems to
have been done to the system. Thus it seems likely that, as society
24. Adoption of a separate schedule for singles and marrieds-as the United States has done-
is not universal. In Canada the taxpaying entity is the individual, not the couple. (And there are
limitations on the tax effects of intra-family transfers). In Great Britain married couples are (for the
most part) the taxpaying unit and use the same rate schedule as singles. In France income is split
among the earner, the spouse and minor children; the total tax is the sum of the tax computed for
each family member using the same tax schedule. For additional details on the tax structure of these
foreign countries, see Dulude, Taxation of the Spouses: A Comparison of Canadian, American, Brit-
ish, French and Swedish Law, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 67 (1985).
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continues to change, "there [will] be no peace here, only an uneasy
truce." 26
III
Though we cannot achieve a consensus on the fairness of the
joint return rates relative to those for the unmarried, we are not
completely stymied in our ability to evaluate the tax system's overall
fairness to singles and marrieds. As has been suggested, the Code
is full of provisions which tie tax liability to marital status. So let's
look broadly beyond the rate schedules at how the tax system copes
with the problems of marriage.
Operating in a number of distinct patterns, a score of rules affect
the tax burden of individuals who marry. The provisions briefly
described and characterized below are not meant to be exhaustive.
Rather they have been selected for their financial or conceptual im-
portance. The rationales underlying these rules, as indicated at the
outset, will be examined in part IV.
A. The Aggregation Model
In general, the tax system taxes the couple on the aggregate of
the separately-calculated taxable income of the individuals. This
combination of tax attributes is ordinarily quite simple, requiring
only addition and subtraction. When there are business dealings be-
tween spouses, the model is frequently not applicable; nevertheless,
the aggregation model would apply, for example, when the wife hires
the husband to work in her business. She would have a deduction
and he would have income in the amount of the salary. 27 In like
manner a loan between spouses would produce interest expense and
interest income.28 The joint return rules, of course, provide for such
aggregation.
26. See Bittker, supra note 5, at 1443.
27. Munroe v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 995 (1935), holds the wife has a deduction. The hus-
band's tax position is presumably determined under I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1987).
28. Shapiro v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 1012 (1934), holds the interest is deductible by hus-
band. Interest income is includible under IRC § 61(4) (1987). For Social Security purposes wages paid
to a spouse are not subject to I.R.C. § 3121(b)(3)(a) (1987).
It should be noted that under current law these items will not necessarily offset one another.
See limitations on deductibility of interest in I.R.C. § 163 (1987). In the case of an interest free (or
below market rate) loan between spouses, I.R.C. § 7872(0(7) ensures that there will be no adverse
consequences to married couples.
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Calculating and combining the separate income of the spouses
is not the only way the aggregation principle operates. Where de-
ductions are curtailed by a percentage of adjusted gross income
(AGI), the aggregation principle requires that the combined income
be subject to the limit. Thus, instead of applying the 7.507 (of AGI)
floor on the separate incomes of husband and wife to determine the
medical deduction, the law requires that the 7.5% floor be applied
to the total AGI of the parties. 29 Working the same way are the
10% floor for casualty losses0 and the various percentage ceilings
for charitable contributions.31
I.R.C. § 1244, which limits deductions to a specific dollar amount
rather than to a percentage of income, operates similarly. Under
this section an unmarried taxpayer can deduct up to $50,000 per
year for losses on sales of certain stock. If the taxpayer is married,
the family limit is $100,000; and it is of no significance whose sales
generated the loss. This, of course, is a result that would be expected
under aggregation theory.32
B. The Merger Model
1. Basic Applications
The model just described does not exhaust the congressional
scheme for taxing husband and wife. In the face of general aware-
ness that money-related issues are a major source of marital dis-
putes, 33 the tax law assumes for a number of purposes that the spouses
29. I.R.C. § 213(a) (1987).
30. Id. § 165(h)(2)(a) (1987). While this provision is illustrative of the aggregation model, I.R.C.
§ 165(h)(4)(b) illustrates the merger model, discussed, infra. This latter rule provides that couples
filing joint returns will be subject to only one $100 deductible on casualties involving personal use
assets, I.R.C. § 165(h)(1) (1987).
The aggregation model is put to the test by I.R.C. § 165(e) (1987) which provides for a deduction
in cases of theft. Can one spouse steal from another? The statute is silent on this matter. The cases,
while not foreclosing the possibility of such treatment, have as yet, it appears, to allow a deduction.
31. I.R.C. § 170(b) (1987).
32. We shall soon see, however, that this is the exceptional result; in most cases where tax
benefits are subject to dollar limitations, the allowance granted to the couple is not simply twice that
alloted to the unmarried individual.
33. Letter from Ann Landers to the author (Sept. 29, 1987): "It is certainly safe to say that
the spending (or not spending) is a factor in many marriage disputes .... My column is about as
good a source [for this] as you can find."
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are models of financial cooperativeness. This device allows the sys-
tem to treat spouses in the same way that corporate law deals with
merged corporations, as one entity (with one economic interest) into
which the separate identities of the participants are dissolved.
The assumption of unity operates most dramatically where the
spouses interact economically. The gift and estate tax marital
deduction 34 provisions are good illustrations. They shelter all intra-
couple transfers of wealth from transfer taxes. The income tax has
analogous rules; no gain (or loss) is recognized on transfers of assets
between spouses 35 (sometimes between ex-spouses as well). Another
rule protects a spouse who wishes to effect a transfer of stock in
an S corporation to the other spouse. Under current law husband
and wife count as one shareholder so that there is no risk of ex-
ceeding the thirty-five shareholder limit on such a transfer.
36
Spousal status can be significant in other family financial plan-
ning areas as well. 37 For instance, there is a special provision which,
under certain circumstances, can reduce the estate tax valuation of
farm property and closely held businesses. 8 The principal condition
for this favorable treatment is that the property in question be left
to a "qualified heir" such as the spouse.3 9 Also benefiting tax plan-
ners are the gift splitting rules4° which provide that, where spouses
34. I.R.C. §§ 2523 & 2056 (1987).
35. Id. § 1041 (1987). The House Committee report explaining § 421 of the Tax Reform Act
of 1984 had this to say: "The Committee believes that, in general, it is inappropriate to tax transfers
between spouses. This policy is already reflected in the Code rule that exempts marital gifts from
the gift tax, and reflects the fact that a husband and wife are a single economic unit."
The report explains further that Congress wanted to override United States v. Davis, 370 U.S.
65, reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962), which had held that the transfer of appreciated property in
a property settlement was a taxable event.
36. I.R.C. § 1361(a)(1), (c)(1) (1987).
37. Sometimes spouses want to rearrange ownership interests in a residence. Suppose husband
and wife are living in a home owned by the husband alone and they wish to move to another home
in which they will be joint owners. Under the general rule of I.R.C. § 1034 (1987) rollover of gain
is allowed only where the same taxpayer owns the house before and after'the sale. Nevertheless I.R.C.
§ 1034(g) (1982) allows an election to qualify for rollover benefits presumably on a theory that technical
ownership of a home is too trivial a matter for tax consequences to hinge on when both spouses are
living in the home. Treas. Reg. 1.1034-1(b)(3) (1987). The regulation also allows spouses who own
a residence jointly to purchase a new residence in the name of only one of them.
38. I.R.C. § 2032A (1987).
39. A "qualified heir" can also be a child or a sibling. Id.
40. Id. § 2513(a)(1) (1987). Gift splitting is also available for generation skipping purposes.
1.R.C. § 2652(a)(2) (1987).
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make the election, each spouse will be deemed to have made a gift
equal to one-half the value of property transferred.
If spouses can share tax-freely in family savings and investment,
they can similarly share in the rewards of family employment. The
Internal Revenue Code often allows a non-employee spouse to piggy-
back on certain tax benefits allowed to an employee-spouse. If the
employee-spouse qualifies, the other spouse can enjoy tax-free meals
and lodging,4' legal advice,42 and other statutory fringe benefits.
43
The merger principle, however, works against taxpayers at least
as often as it works for them, as is evident from the following
provisions. Consider first the grantor trust rules. Under TRA 86,
if a taxpayer creates a five-year trust for the benefit of his adult
children and provides for a remainder to his spouse, the settlor is
treated as if he had retained the remainder for himself with the result
that he is taxed on trust income. 4 Prior to TRA 86, this would have
been a successful spousal remainder trust with no attribution made
to the grantor. (Of course, both before and after TRA 86 if the
estate following the term of years had been given to anyone besides
the grantor or the grantor's spouse the income would be taxed to
the children.)
Under the new grantor trust rules, almost any significant power
or interest held by a a grantor's cohabiting spouse is attributable
to the grantor. 45 Thus, trust income would be taxable to the grantor
if his cohabiting spouse holds a power to control the beneficial en-
joyment of income, 46 a prohibited administrative power,47 or a power
of revocation. 48
41. Id. § 119(a) (1987).
42. Id. § 120 (1987).
43. Id. § 132(0(2) (1987).
44. Id. §§ 673(a) & 672(e) (1987).
45. Id. § 672(e) (1987).
46. Id. § 674 (1987).
47. Id. § 675 (1987).
48. Id. § 676 (1987). Also affecting grantors of trusts, I.R.C. § 643(f) (1987) requires that
husband and wife be treated as one person for a different purpose. If both spouses create trusts for
the same beneficiaries and the-"principal purpose" of these trusts is tax avoidance, the trusts will
be merged so as to eliminate the advantages of income splitting under I.R.C. § 1(e) (1987).
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The rules pertaining to redemption of securities carry over the
same idea of family attribution (also to the tax detriment of the
family). Except in the case of a complete termination of interest, 49
a taxpayer is treated as owning all the stock held by his spouse.5 0
As a result of this contructive ownership, it is often difficult to claim
a "substantially disproportionate" redemption (or a redemption "not
equivalent to a. dividend") and thus to qualify for capital, as op-
posed to ordinary income, treatment under I.R.C. 302(b)(2) (or
(b)(1)).5
1
If a taxpayer sells a security at a loss and repurchases it within
thirty days, the loss is deemed artificial; he cannot claim it.52 Like-
wise, if the taxpayer's spouse buys back the security, the loss is not
available.53 Here again action by one spouse is attributed to the
other.
Security owners are also adversely affected by the rules defining
personal holding companies5 4 and controlled corporations.5 5 For these
purposes,56 husband and wife are treated as one shareholder. Thus,
two married taxpayers are more likely to be subject to these pro-
visions than two unmarried ones.
The merger model probably works most frequently to limit de-
ductions available to married taxpayers. For example, I.R.C. § 179,
which allows taxpayers a deduction of up to $10,000 for certain
purchases of depreciable assets, treats the married couple as only
one taxpayer, that is, eligible for only one such deduction.57 Sim-
49. Id. § 302(b)(3) (1987).
50. Id. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i) (1987).
51. It is still important to know whether a redemption produces capital gain or dividend income
because after offsetting capital gains, capital losses can be used only to offset a limited amount of
ordinary income. Id. § 1211 (1987). It is more obviously important to distinguish between capital
loss and dividend income. This problem of characterization could come up where the redemption
price is less than the losses of the shares redeemed.
52. Id. § 1091(a) (1987).
53. McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947).
54. I.R.C. §§ 541-547 (1987).
55. Id. §§ 1561-1563 (1987).
56. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for application of the same principle in S cor-
porations situation.
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(e) (1987).
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ilarly, married couples are limited to a deduction of $25 per donee
for business gifts, the same as singles.5 8
I.R.C. § 121 takes this two-marrieds-as-one-single notion a step
further. If joint unmarried owners comply with § 121 residency and
age requirements, they are each entitled to an exclusion of $125,000.
If they are married and sell the homestead at a gain they are entitled
to only one $125,000 exclusion. 59 Moreover, if one spouse owns the
homestead and marries a person who has previously exercised her
§ 121 election, the first spouse forfeits his right of exclusion. 60
The capital loss and passive loss rules continue in this vein. If
joint, unmarried owners of a capital asset sell it at a loss, each is
able to offset up to $3,000 against ordinary income. 61 If, however,
they are married, only one $3,000 loss allowance is available. The
passive loss rules, 62 which are somewhat more complex, have even
harsher effects. If an unmarried taxpayer owns rental real estate
whose management he "actively participates in," he is entitled to
an annual deduction of up to $25,000 against non-passive income
for any losses he may incur. This loss starts to be phased out at
the AGI level of $100,000 and is completely disallowed once AGI
reaches $150,000.63 For married couples the deduction limit and
phase-out points are identical to those for the single taxpayer.
2. Limitations on the Merger Model.
In the family financial planning area, as we have seen, most of
the rules are premised on an assumption of the identity of spousal
interests. Consider, for example, the case of the husband who creates
58. I.R.C. § 274(b)(1), (2) (1987).
Though not providing a limitation on deductions, the earned income credit (I.R.C. § 32 (1987))
offers a similar illustration of merger theory. Under this provision, the credit, which is refundable,
is equal to 14% of the first $5,714 of earned income (for a maximum credit of $800). The credit is
subject to a 10% reduction for each dollar of AGI or earned income, whichever is higher, in excess
of $6,500. Pertinent to the analysis here is that the beginning phase-out point is the same for marrieds
and singles.
59. I.R.C. § 121(b) (1987).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 1211 (1987).
62. Id. § 469 (1987).
63. Id. § 469(i) (1987).
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an inter vivos sprinkle trust for the benefit of his children, and
naming the wife as trustee. On a merger theory the power to des-
ignate beneficiaries given to the wife is attributable to the husband;
and, under grantor trust rules, he is treated as the owner and is
taxed on trust income. 64 However, for estate tax purposes, the power
given to the wife is not attributed to the husband to force inclusion
of the trust property in his estate.65
The same assumption of the economic independence of the
spouses underlies another estate tax rule. Consider a husband who
transfers property in trust for the benefit of his wife during his life
with remainder over to their children. Some time later he dies. The
property is not includible in his estate even though the grantor had
essentially reserved a life estate, a measure that ordinarily forces
inclusion of property in the estate under I.R.C. § 2036.66
The child care credit67 rules show a different kind of limitation
of the merger model. Under these rules a credit is available for
"employment-related expenses" (i.e., costs of supervising children
so that an adult can work). In the case of a married couple, "qual-
ifying" expenses for purposes of calculating the credit are limited
to the income of the lesser-earning spouse. In the case of a single
taxpayer his earnings are the limit. Practically speaking, of course,
the distinction is understandable; in a one-earner marriage the stay-
at-home spouse can provide the child care services, which is not so
in the case of the single taxpayer who presumably lives alone. For
our purposes, it is worth noting that the couple is not literally treated
as one individual under these circumstances.6 8
64. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
65. I.R.C. § 2038 (1987) would force inclusion if the donor had retained the power himself.
66. Id. § 2036 (1987). This is an interesting result. If we accept the assumption that income
is shared, then A to A's spouse for the life of A, remainder to B is similar to the creation of two
trusts:
1. A to A for life, remainder to B, and
2. A to A's spouse for A's life, remainder to B.
If the disposition had taken this form, there would be no question that the value of the property
in trust would be includible in A's estate. Nevertheless, in the above hypothetical, property is not
includible in the estate.
67. Id. § 21 (1987).
68. 1 have focused on the departure from the merger model here though, in fact, I.R.C. § 21
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As a final departure from the merger model, the set of net op-
erating loss rules must be considered.69 These rules function much
like the Code provisions limiting loss carryovers of corporations that
are acquired or which are parties to a reorganization.70 A surviving
spouse who incurs a loss after the other spouse's death may not
carry the loss back to a joint return year in which the income had
been earned entirely by the deceased spouse. 71 Similarly, a net op-
erating loss sustained by one spouse prior to marriage cannot offset
the other spouse's income on a joint return.72 Trafficking in "loss"
spouses - as in loss corporations - is not condoned.
C. The Married Couple as One and One-Half People
There is a third model used by Congress in dealing with married
taxpayers. This approach is consistent with that used to derive the
rate schedules, which tax the married couple more than two singles
each with half the income, but less than a single individual with the
same total income. 73
Reference has already been made to the inclusion rule for social
security benefits under which taxable income is triggered at the
$25,000 level for individuals and at the $32,000 level for marrieds.74
The alternative minimum tax exemption and beginning exemption
phase-out points of $40,000 and $150,000 for joint filers, and $30,000
and $112,500 for singles, are another example. 75 Also serving to
(1987) is based in part on the merger model. The child care credit is 30% of the employment-related
expenses. If the adjusted gross income, however, is over $10,000, the 30% credit can drop as low
as 20%. That $10,000 trigger point is the same for marrieds as for singles.
Perhaps this is the best place to mention the so-called "innocent spouse" rule which also has
merger and nonmerger characteristics. In general, where couples file a joint return "the liability with
respect to the tax shall be joint and several." I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3). The merger model would seem to
demand this. The real world descends in the form of an exception. If there is a "substantial un-
derstatement of tax attributable to grossly erroneous items of one spouse" of which the other spouse
"did not know, and had no reason to know," then the other spouse shall be relieved of liability.
I.R.C. § 6013(e).
69. See Treas. Reg. § 1.172-7 (1987).
70. See I.R.C. §§ 381 & 382 (1987).
71. Zeeman v. United States, 395 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1968).
72. Calvin v. United States, 354 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1965).
73. See supra discussion in pt. II.
74. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
75. I.R.C. § 55(d) (1987).
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illustrate the one and one-half people model is the standard de-
duction - $5,000 for married couples contrasted with $3,000 for
singles, 76 and the additional $600 standard deduction for each mar-
ried taxpayer age 65 or blind contrasted with $750 for singles. 77
In this regard, perhaps the most striking of TRA 86's changes
are the amendments to the Individual Retirement Account (IRA)
rules.78 Under old law each spouse could deduct IRA contributions
up to the higher of $2,000 or the amount of earned income. This
deduction could be taken even if the spouses participated in another
retirement plan. As a result of TRA 86 a deduction is harder to
come by. If a married couple filing a joint return shows adjusted
gross income of more than $50,000, and if either spouse is covered
by an employer retirement plan, neither spouse can make deductible
IRA contributions. The phase-out point for individuals, by contrast,
is $35,000. Phase-outs begin at the $40,000 level for marrieds and
$25,000 level for singles. 79
D. When Is Marriage "Effective" for Tax Purposes?
If the tax rules relating to marriage are important, then it is also
important to know when they apply, that is, when marriage is "ef-
fective." Here, too, there is no uniform approach; marital status
may have to be determined differently depending on the specific rule
in question. For example, for purposes of the $125,000 home-gain
exclusion, the law looks to marital status at the time of sale.80 The
grantor trust rules apply if the taxpayer is married at the time of
the transaction and the spouse is then living with the grantor.81
For purposes of eligibility to file a joint return, the tax law eval-
uates marital status at the end of the year;82 but to determine the
appropriate rate schedule and the standard deduction,83 the law looks
76. Id. § 63(c)(2) (1987).
77. Id. § 63(f) (1987).
78. Id. § 219 (1987).
79. Id. § 219(g) (1987).
80. Id. § 121(d)(6) (1987).
81. Id. § 672(e) (1987).
82. Id. § 6013(d)(1) (1987).
83. Id. §§ 2(c), 63(g), 7703 (1987).
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to that status for the last six months of the year. If, however, during
this period taxpayers live apart from their spouses and maintain a
household in which a dependent child resides, taxpayers are not
"considered as married."
E. Social Security
Although this article deals with the income and transfer tax im-
plications of marriage, it does not seem fitting to ignore social se-
curity considerations completely' 4 Under social security law, generally
speaking, individuals are entitled to receive at age 65 a benefit equal
to 1) that which they can claim based on their own contribution
record or 2) 50% of their spouse's "primary insurance amount"
based on such spouse's contribution record, whichever is greater.
Much like the income tax, then, social security recognizes the special
role of the spouse. By providing benefits to a spouse even if he or
she has not worked (and hence has not paid into the system), these
rules function like a marriage bonus.
The other side of this marriage bonus, however, is both a singles
tax and a marriage penalty. To illustrate: Consider a married couple
A and B. A worked until age 65 while B was a homemaker. Now
consider C and D who each earned one-half as much as A. Because
of spousal benefits A and B will usually receive more from the
system than will C and D who are in the same economic position
and who have contributed the same amount into the system. This
is true regardless of whether C and D are single or married. 85
84. This summary is pieced together from the following sources: Reno & Upp, Social Security
and the Family, in TAXING TE FAe.y 139-64 (R. Penner ed. 1983). A CHALLENOE To SoCIAL SEcuRITY,
Tn CHANonio ROLES OF WOMEN AND MEN IN AmERICAN SocarY (R. Burkhauser & K. Holden, eds.
1982); W. ACHENBAUM, SOCIAL SEcLurry VISIONS AND REVISIONS (1986).
85. The disadvantageous position of two-worker couples can be seen this way. When the second
spouse in the family decides to work, he is receiving a net return that is less than a fair one for his
dollar inputs. The reason is that much of what he receives from social security is what he would
have received anyhow in the form of spouse benefits on the earnings of the first spouse.
It should be noted that some commentators have taken the position that social security is not
as unfair to two-worker couples as has been made out because of certain insurance protections available
to them that are not available to one-worker couples. See Incremental Change in Social Security
Needed to Result in Equal and Fair Treatment of Men and Women, in A CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL
SECUITY 235, 239 (R. Burkhauser & Holden, eds. 1982).
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Thus, it is apparent that one-worker families are favored over
two-worker families and singles. As to the treatment of singles rel-
ative to two-worker marrieds under the above formula, the result
depends on whether the parties are alive. While the parties are alive,
there will ordinarily be no difference in benefits, because spouses
will be paid in accordance with their own work record which will
provide them with more than 50% of the other spouse's entitlement.
Thus marriage will confer no benefit. (There will be no difference
in costs either if the income of each person is the same).
Upon the death of one of the spouses this result may change.
Since the surviving spouse would be entitled to his own benefit or
that of the deceased spouse, whichever is higher, the position of the
surviving spouse may be improved if his personal benefit is less than
that of the deceased spouse. Of course, the survivor of the unmarried
couple would experience no change in benefits.
In sum, the income tax marriage penalty (narrowly defined) is
not replicated in the social security area. If anything, two marrieds
will come out ahead of their single counterparts in the social security
lottery.
IV
Can any sense be made out of these varied rules which sometimes
treat married couples as one person, sometimes as one and one-half,
and sometimes as two people? We can begin with the simplest family
tax problem - how to deal with transactions between spouses.
The argument has been made that at the core we are individuals,
not component parts of a couple. For this reason and because of
the weakening of marital ties and the growing financial independence
of what used to be the stay-at-home spouse, the argument is that
married people should be treated as autonomous individuals for tax
purposes. The problem with this analysis, of course, is that not-
withstanding some weakening of marital bonds, the marital knot is
oftentimes still strong. Thus many inter-spousal transactions are
purely formal. Unless the IRS regularly launched investigations into
'the quality of marriages, it would surely make a mockery of the
"tax system to allow a taxpayer to recognize losses - or to recognize
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gains and get a stepped-up basis - on transactions that have little
or no meaning to the parties. This concern explains the applicable
income tax rules on intra-couple transactions 6 In the transfer tax
area, this same concern is given as the reason for the unlimited
marital deduction for transfers between spouses.
8 7
The only difficulty with this explanation is that, notwithstanding
the similarity of their implied and stated rationales, the rules in the
income and transfer tax areas are profoundly different in one im-
portant respect. In the former, income is assumed to be shared re-
gardless of what in fact transpires, while in the latter assets are
treated as being shared only where in fact they are shared. In short,
it is really only income that is assumed to be shared; capital is not.
If merger theory applied here in its pure form a testamentary
gift by a spouse would result in a deemed transfer by each spouse
of one-half of the property. Of course, the fact that capital is not
deemed to be shared should not come as a surprise, for, in common
law jurisdictions, once income is used for support, the remainder
usually belongs (as capital) to the spouse who earned it. The other
spouse's claim, far from being equal, is limited in value and is gen-
erally assertable only at the time of divorce or death.
The notion that capital is not shared may shed light on some of
the limitations of merger theory that apply in the transfer tax area.
For example, if a wife transfers property in trust for the benefit of
her adult children giving the husband a power of invasion (also for
the benefit of children) over principal, the husband's power over
the property (capital) is not attributable to the wife for purposes of
requiring some or all the property to be includible in her estate.
If capital is not deemed to be shared in law, classical merger
theory has not really justified the estate and gift tax marital de-
duction. Does it justify the other tax rules examined here? Consider
two unmarried taxpayers benefiting from the $10,000 deduction un-
der I.R.C. § 179. Should they lose one of their deductions when
86. I.R.C. § 1041 (1987); see also supra note 35.
87. Id. §§ 2056 & 2523 (1987); see also supra note 35.
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they marry?88 The Code solution or merger theory is only really
defensible if a slightly different set of facts is assumed. Suppose X
and Y marry; X owns a business (that buys equipment) while Y is
a spendthrift. Under marriage neutrality, X should not be entitled
to $20,000 of § 179 deductions merely because of his marriage to
Y.
The one and one-half person solution can be similarly challenged.
Let's take A and B, singles, each of whom participates in a deferred
compensation plan and has adjusted gross income of $22,500. Be-
cause each has less than $25,000 of AGI, each can contribute and
deduct the full $2,000 to an IRA. If they marry, by contrast, under
current limitations that become effective at $40,000 of adjusted gross
income, each will be entitled to a deduction of only $1,000.89
Here again the logic of the statute is apparent only if somewhat
different facts are assumed. Suppose A earns $2,000 and has no
other income; B earns $43,000. Both participate in a deferred com-
pensation plan. If the tax system simply doubles the ceiling of in-
dividuals to $50,000, both A and B would qualify for an IRA.90
The problem is, of course, that if B had remained single, he would
not have been eligible for the deduction. Under marriage neutrality,
however, the fact of his marriage should not generate a deduction
for him.
In effect the tax system is saying to A and B that it is treating
them as a couple, applying tax-equality principles. (Of course, to
the extent that each member of the couple must have earned income
for IRA purposes, 9' i.e., income earned by one cannot be shared,
the rule is not tax equal but marriage neutral). As a result, it is
inevitably going to be easier for the high earner to qualify for the
IRA deduction. In exchange for this "generosity" - or perhaps
more precisely to replace the income lost from it - the IRA imposes
88. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
89. I.R.C. § 219(g) (1987).
90. Id.
91. Of course to the extent that each member of the couple must have earned income for IRA
purposes (i.e., income earned by one cannot be shared), the rule is not tax equal but marriage neutral.
I.R.C. § 219(g) (1987).
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a $10,000 lower ceiling on the couple ($40,000) than the total of
the ceilings that would be applied to the individuals if they were
unmarried ($50,000).92
It should be apparent that the Code's solutions and these ex-
planations are still problematic. In the case of § 179 deductions,
there is in effect a conclusive presumption of a "classical family"
in which all the property is owned by one spouse. The couple is
thus disadvantaged because it has no opportunity to demonstrate
that each spouse might be entitled in his or her own right to the
deduction.
The problem with the IRA solution is that while it is true that
the high earner may benefit by the rule adopted, it is just as likely
that the low earner will be hurt. By marrying, say, a $48,000 per
year spouse, the $2,000 per year spouse loses the right to any de-
duction. 93 Also importantly for our purposes, beginning the IRA
phase-out at $40,000 victimizes the two-earner couple, the one which
ordinarily pays a high marriage tax (narrowly viewed).
Now that we understand the rationale for Congress's refusal to
simply double deductions to all married couples, it seems useful to
think about why Congress did not consistently adopt the same ap-
proach for all married couples. In other words, why doesn't the
Code apply the dominant merger model to all provisions affected
by marriage instead of selectively applying both that model and the
one and one-half person model?
As for the rates, most theorists would deny that tax rates on
marrieds and singles should be the same (as they were from 1913
to 1948) if a joint return is filed. The reason is that there is una-
voidably less taxpaying capacity in the couple than in a single, if
only because two people must be supported out of the same income.
When this notion that two cannot live as cheaply as one is combined
with the idea that marrieds enjoy economies of scale, the result under
the rate schedules is that the married couple pays more than two
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with the same income. 94 This approach is, of course, the one and
one-half person model.
Like the rate schedules the standard deduction 95 applies to all
taxpayers. The alternative minimum tax,96 though affecting only se-
lected (usually wealthy) taxpayers, nevertheless applies in lieu of the
regular tax schedules. Since the rate schedule for marrieds is based
on the one and one-half person model, so logically should these
other provisions.
The IRA deduction 97 and social security inclusion rules, 98 which
also embody the one and one-half taxpayer principle, require a
somewhat different explanation. There is a fundamental distinction
between these provisions and, for example, I.R.C. § 179 or § 1211
(limiting deductions for capital losses), which are illustrations of the
merger model. In effect, what Congress is saying in § 179 and §
1211 is that deductions under these sections are "tainted," i.e., that
they would not be allowed under "pure" tax theory and are being
allowed only for the limited purpose of simplifying tax return prep-
aration.99 By contrast, in the Social Security and IRA areas - whether
or not this linkage is sound - the amount of income recognized
or deduction allowed is a function of total, mostly "untainted,"
family income. This being the case, it would be grossly unfair for
Congress to use the same number of dollars as phase-out points for
singles and marrieds. Nevertheless, in the passive loss area, this is,
inexplicably, precisely what Congress did. 10°
Why, depending on the substantive rule in question, should there
be different times at which marital status must be examined? In the
94. See supra discussion in pt. II.
95. I.R.C. § 63(c) (1987).
96. I.R.C. § 55 (1987).
97. See supra notes 78, 79, 89-95 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
99. Presumably if both spouses operate businesses or own stock, they don't "need" the de-
duction; the couple can hire an accountant to keep appropriate bookkeeping records.
100. See supra notes 62 & 63 and accompanying text. It should be noted that this provision,
like others that seem to work against the taxpayers, has features that turn out to benefit them. The
passive loss rules favor marriage in that the deduction for passive losses of up to $25,000 is allowed
even if the owner spouse doesn't "actively participate in" the rental activity, as long as his spouse
does. I.R.C. § 469(i)(6)(D) (1987).
19881 1159
33
Subotnik: The Marriage Tax Revisited: An Analysis of the Tax Consequences o
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
case of the home-gain exclusion 01 and grantor trust rules, 10 2 it does
not seem unreasonable to look at marital status at the time of the
sale or trust creation rather than at the end of the year. Otherwise
a taxpayer engaging in a § 121 or § 671- § 677 transaction might
be seriously harmed if he subsequently marries during the taxable
year. 103
Unlike the preceding substantive rules, the joint return provisions
require that marital status be determined at the end of the year. 1°4
This rule is more problematical, for in giving effect to eleventh-hour
marriage, it allows the taxpayer to manipulate the system to his
advantage. In the vast majority of cases there is no issue of sham
marriage; however, since there is virtually no "sharing" (or economy
of scale), an important underpinning to the tax law regarding mar-
riage is absent.
An approach similar to the one adopted by I.R.C. § 7703 seems
preferable. Under that rule if a taxpayer lives apart from his spouse
for the last six months of the year and supports a child who resides
in his home, he is not considered married. One can quarrel with §
7703, which applies broadly in the Code, by asking why it should
make a difference whether there is a child or not. But at least the
six-month rule helps to define marriages that are economically real.
In sum, there are basically two types of tax rules as discussed
in the preceeding section, those that provide special treatment for
inter-spousal transactions and those that determine the way marriage
will affect the availability of certain tax benefits, i.e., whether the
couple will be viewed as one, one and one-half, or two persons. For
virtually all of these latter rules, it is irrelevant whether the benefits
would have been available to the parties in question had they been
single. The rules here, as in the case of the rates, reflect the Con-
gressional policy of tax equality rather than marriage neutrality.
101. See supra notes 59 & 60 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 44-48.
103. A rule looking to marital status at the end of the year would unnecessarily complicate
matters for individuals whose divorces during the year produced settlements where trust powers were
given by one spouse to the other.
104. But see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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The tour and analysis of the marriage-related provisions of the
tax law are over. Remaining only is the problem of determining the
bottom line on the impact of marriage on tax liabilities.
As will readily be noted, the question of the overall marriage
neutrality of the tax system does not allow a simple, comprehensive
answer. To be sure, in the estate and gift tax area, marriage appears
a clear benefit to taxpayers; the unlimited marital deduction, 15 split
gift rules, 106 and special provisions applicable to owners of closely
held corporations'0 7 all weigh heavily in favor of marriage. So do
the transfer tax rules which allow trust powers and interests to be
given to spouses without attribution back to the donor spouse. The
reach of the transfer taxes, however, threatens only a small fraction
of taxpayers, those with estates of more than $600,000.108
On the income tax side, a clear reading is unavailable, as is
evident from consideration of the tax-free transfer rules between
spouses. At first impression it would appear that the exemption from
tax consequences is an overwhelming benefit to married taxpayers.
After all, one of the reasons for the enactment of I.R.C. § 1041
was the unhappy experience with United States v. Davis,1°9 which
held that gain would be recognized upon the transfer of appreciated
property by one spouse to the other as part of a property settlement.
It is not inconceivable, however, that parties in this position might
want the transferor to incur the tax, perhaps because of offsetting
losses during the year on other transactions. In this manner a high-
bracket transferee could get a step-up in basis at no effective tax
cost to the transferor. And, ordinarily, transferors would surely want
to be able to recognize loss on inter-spousal transactions. If the price
of abolishing the nonrecognition rule for gain is eliminating the non-
105. I.R.C. §§ 2056 & 2523 (1987).
106. I.R.C. § 2513 (1987).
107. I.R.C. § 2032A (1987).
108. According to S. SUREy, P. McDAN-n & H. GUTM, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANsFER TAx-
ATION 45 (1987). "It is estimated that ... taxable returns will represent no more than 3/10th of 1
percent of adult deaths each year."
109. Davis, 370 U.S. 65.
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recognition for loss on inter-spousal transactions, it is hard to say
whether affected taxpayers would emerge as net winners or losers. 10
Similar complexity attends analysis of Code provisions such as
§ 179.111 The major effect of marriage under that rule will be to
curtail benefits, since married couples are limited to one $10,000
deduction. On the other hand one can easily conceive of a taxpayer
A who owns a business that is operating at a loss. To ensure an
income, he marries B, a wage earner. Marriage in this case will allow
A to make use of the § 179 deduction which would not otherwise
have been useful to him.
This discussion, of course, leads to a broader observation. The
joint return will frequently allow taxpayers to offset the gains of
one with the losses of the other. This is a factor that will tend to
offset the marriage tax, narrowly viewed, which results from the
addition of one spouse's income to that of the other. The point
should not be overstated; in most activities designed to be money-
making, taxpayers (thankfully) operate in the black.
The husband-and-wife-as-one shareholder rule' 2 provides cor-
porations with maximum flexibility in securing S Corporation status.
On the other hand, the rules can also work against married tax-
payers. By reducing the number of "shareholders", the rule has the
effect of increasing the likelihood of personal holding company"'
and controlled corporation" 4 status, possibly resulting in an extra
tax liability.
The grantor trust rules," 5 work only one way - against married
taxpayers. If, as has been discussed, a taxpayer is cohabiting with
his spouse, a prohibited interest or power in trust property given to
the spouse will result in the income being taxed to the grantor.
110. Reasoned speculation suggests that since many inter-spousal transfers are elective, taxpayers
would come out ahead.
111. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
112. I.R.C. § 1361(c) (1987).
113. See supra note 54.
114. See supra note 55.
115. See supra notes 44-48.
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Generally speaking, the attribution rules' 16 in the stock redemp-
tion area have worked against taxpayers since they have produced
dividend income instead of capital gain. But it is certainly conceiv-
able that the distributee shareholder is a corporation that prefers
dividend income on account of the dividend received deduction.117
Alternatively, it is possible that the distributee shareholder is an
individual who has enough ordinary losses to offset the dividend
income. In any event, TRA 86, which repealed the capital gain de-
duction, substantially diminishes the impact of this provision.
The home-gain exclusion disadvantages married taxpayers." 8 On
the other hand, the fringe benefit rules allow spouses an extensive
range of tax free benefits not available to friends (whether live-in
or not) of a taxpayer. Additionally, the social security rules" 9 and
§ 1244 favor marriage.
It would be helpful if we could total the nation's marital de-
ductions, § 179 deductions, etc. and weigh the benefits and dis-
advantages of marriage. Perhaps these assessments are not far from
reality. Under the name of TAXSIM, the National Bureau of Ec-
onomic Research has a bank of tax information compiled from many
thousands of returns which might allow such research. Even so, a
complete analysis of the tax effect of marriage will be elusive, if
only because exclusions such as fringe benefits are, just that, ex-
clusions and no record is currently kept of them.
Though no grand conclusion can be drawn on the net overall
tax effect of marriage, perhaps a less sweeping, more tentative ob-
servation can be usefully made. The extent to which marriage affects
net tax liability of any individual, both positively and negatively,
will depend, of course, on the personal economic circumstances of
the taxpayer. Consider the couple in which the husband is an airline
executive and the wife is successfully self-employed. This couple may
well find that an important tax benefit received from marriage is
the right to exclude from income the value of free travel offered to
116. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
117. I.R.C. § 243 (1987).
118. See supra notes 59 & 60 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 84 & 85 and accompanying text.
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the spouse of an employee.120 Moreover, for middle class taxpayers
like these, the unlimited marital deduction will be helpful in shel-
tering all tax in the estate of the first to die. 21
But, at the same time as the taxpayers benefit from these pro-
visions, others will set them back - in this case probably the rate-
based marriage penalty, 22 the IRA deduction 23 rule, and the social
security inclusion provision,'24 among others. In short, then, many
families may well find that the numerous tax rules tied to marriage
tend to counteract one another, thereby reducing nonneutralities.
This is not to suggest that there is no cause for concern. The
last two decades have witnessed an important economic trend in-
volving families. In 1955 only 60% of families consisted of a work-
ing spouse and a stay-at-home spouse. By contrast in 1985 this
percentage dropped to 20%.125 The stay-at-home spouse is going to
work. This trend may well be causing a ganging-up of provisions
against the modern taxpayer. Table 4,126 which takes into account
the IRA limitations, helps introduce the problem by comparing the
tax burden of singles and marrieds at varying income levels and at
varying percentage contributions by the spouses. While the rela-
tionship between the marriage tax, income level and spousal income
split is quite complex, what stands out is the 39.74% marriage pen-
alty where each spouse earns $25,000.
120. I.R.C. § 132 (1987).
121. Id. §§ 2056 & 2523 (1987).
122. See supra note 10 and accompanying tables.
123. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text.
125. U.S. DEP'T OF THE CENSUS, BUAu OF LABOR STATISTICS (July 1986).
126. See G. EsENwEN, supra note 10.
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Even more dramatic results are produced by adding variables.
If the taxpayers in the above case each have a capital loss in the
year in which they marry, the marriage tax penalty (broadly defined)
will be significantly higher. This is due, again, to the loss of $3,000
in capital loss offsets by married couples. 27
This hypothetical, though designed to dramatize the point, is by
no means unrealistic. With more two-earner families it is likely that
more spouses, if treated as singles, would be able to claim capital
loss, § 179, and IRA deductions in their own right. A fair social
security inclusion rule will be more important to them because they
will be receiving more social security. Also, because they are both
wage earners, the spousal exclusion rule for fringe benefits will be
less important to them.
Maybe the only firm conclusion on the subject of the marriage
tax (broadly defined) is that Congress is quite often not playing fair
with married couples when allocating "benefits" to them, partic-
ularly when these benefits are limited to those available to single
individuals. There are at least two ways to solve this problem. First,
Congress could simply provide that couples should get 200% of
whatever benefits are available to singles regardless of whether the
benefits would have been available to them as singles. Or, if that
is felt to be too extravagant, perhaps 150% of the singles' benefits
could be allowed on some averaging principle.
The other solution, which is my recommendation, is that Con-
gress should allow benefits to "second" spouses if a showing is made
that these spouses would have been entitled to them if they had been
single. Thus, for example, one § 179 deduction would be available
if one spouse purchased $10,000 of depreciable property and another
one if the second spouse was a joint owner in the asset or purchased
a different depreciable asset. This latter approach would represent
a departure from tax equality and an acceptance, in part, of mar-
riage neutrality, which for the first 35 years of the income tax system
was the prevailing policy.28
127. It is true, of course, that under I.R.C. § 1212 (1987) the capital loss will be able to offset
ordinary income in subsequent years.
128. See supra text between notes 22-23.
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The only problem may be dealing with community property;
however, the problem is not an overwhelming one. If property owned
is community property, then $20,000 of § 179 deductions would be
allowed. Taxpayers in common law states would have little to quarrel
about; they could achieve the same result by making their spouses
co-owners in the business property. No doubt in common law states
there would be some extra administrative burden, but this burden
should not present a political problem as even now there are some
significant differences in the way the tax law affects the two' 29 classes
of taxpayers.
CONCLUSION
For at least the last five years it has been difficult to open a
newspaper (a periodical of general interest) without reading about
criticisms of our institutions for failing to adjust to modern family
life. Spurring a number of these pieces is the trend towards two-
worker families previously mentioned 30 and the related increase in
the percentage of working mothers with school-age children,' called
"the greatest single shift in family life in this century. 132 Areas
targeted for reform have included child care delivery, social security 33
and the income tax. Within this last category proposals have been
made to increase both the exemption for children and the child care
credit.134
This article has considered the related problem of the fairness
of the income tax to the married couple. To the end of achieving
this fairness, the concrete proposal offered should serve as a useful
first step. When the empirical work is done, refinements in reform
will be possible.
129. For example, under I.R.C. § 1014 property jointly held by spouses gets a step-up in basis
for only one-half the property while for community property the basis in the entire asset is stepped-
up.
130. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
131. In 1960, 42.5% of mothers with school-age children worked; by contrast in 1985, 70%
worked. U.S. DEP'T OF THE CENSUS, BURvaU OF LABOR STATISTICS (July 1986).
132. See NEw CHOICES IN A CHANGING AMERICA, DEMOCRATIC NAT'L Comm. REP. 8 (1986) [here-
inafter NEw CHoIcES].
133. See Reno & Upp, supra note 84.
134. See NEw CHOIcES, supra note 134, at 13.
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